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INTRODUCTION
For most of the world, the horrific events of September 11 could bring forth
only one judgment in human, moral or social terms. Even for those of us far
removed from the United States who saw the events on television - live and
replayed time and time again – the truth was simple: the perpetrators and
planners of these atrocities had committed a profound wrong, an act of evil
and malevolence that surpassed in quality and impact any other terrorist
attack in recent memory. While those who had hijacked the four planes and
sent thousands of innocent victims to their deaths could not longer be brought
to justice before any terrestrial court, there understandably arose out of the
anger and grief a grim determination that those who had instigated and
supported the commission of these acts would pay the price.
Yet this unanimity of moral outrage and condemnation in the immediate
aftermath of September 11 has given way to controversy and uncertainty in
relation to many aspects of the legal and political responses to those events.
The ordinary citizen might be forgiven for thinking that our international and
national law and legal institutions should have no difficulty in bringing to
justice those responsible for these outrages against human life and dignity –
and that this would be done expeditiously in a manner consistent not only with
the goals of justice but also in accordance with the protections of the rule of
law, including essential principles of fairness and fundamental rights.
2But what have we seen? Almost every aspect of the various responses to
September 11 has been controversial and its legality challenged, from the
question of whether the US had been the victim of an armed attack entitling it
to the exercise of the inherent right to self-defence; whether the actions it took
were a legitimate exercise of that right; the status and rights of those captured
during the campaign in Afghanistan; the question whether many of these
detainees have indeed committed any offence under international or national
law; and attacks on proposed national and international anti-terrorist
legislation on the ground that they are ineffectual and encroach excessively
on important human rights protections. Much – though perhaps not all--
seems confusion, and this in the face of a self-evidently grievous wrong
against individuals and the broader community.
Why does the international and national legal response seem so much in
disarray and so contested and confused?
In this lecture tonight I wish to address a number of aspects of the aftermath
of September 11, in particular the adequacy of the international legal system
to respond to the challenges those events have posed and the difficulties that
have arisen in our efforts to address the consequences of those events at the
international and national levels.
My remarks will be structured around three issues:
War and crime, or war or crime: what is the appropriate model of law that
should be applied to events such as September 11 and to terrorism more
generally?
A. International efforts to address terrorism, including the problem
of definition: in this section I will discuss the challenges that face us in
formulating a workable international definition of terrorism, an
endeavour that is fundamental to a global campaign against it.
3B. Terrorism and human rights: Finally, I will touch on some aspects of
the relationship between terrorism and human rights at the international
and national levels, and argue that we should not be seduced by the
sirenic call of security that lures us in the current calls to root out
terrorism in all its forms.
A. WAR AND CRIME, OR WAR OR CRIME?
Critical to the debate over how we should respond to September 11 has been
a contest between two models, that of war and that of criminal justice.
International law's approach to each of these areas is fundamentally different.
I will be arguing that neither the laws of war not the criminal justice model has
been a satisfactory response to September 11, and that a rethinking is due of
aspects of the legal framework of how we approach the type of situation that
has resulted from those events.
In war (or situations of armed conflict as modern terminology has it) many
acts are permitted that would be common crimes in non-war times – the
immunity of soldiers from prosecution for murder for the killing of enemy
soldiers in combat is but one example. Where there is no war, then deliberate
killing is murder.
The rules which regulate the conduct of war and the immunities and privileges
that certain classes of combatants enjoy is enormously complex, the result of
centuries of accretive developments, which reflect changes of thinking about
permissible forms of warfare and the development of ever more powerful and
effective ways of killing large numbers of people. At the heart of the law of war
is the paradoxical acceptance that we may kill if we must, but we must not act
inhumanely in doing so and we must restrict our attacks to legitimate.military
targets, leaving civilians unharmed so far as possible.
This body of law has its origins in the depths of history, as different
communities have placed limits on how one's enemies may be treated in
warfare, often in response to atrocities and limits whose existence has often
been rendered hollow by continued or new forms of atrocity.
4A famous example of the embodiment of these moral judgments in the social
code, even of warrior societies, is found in the climactic scenes of Homer's
Iliad which take place after the Trojan prince Hector has killed in battle the
Greek warrior Patrocles, the close friend and companion of Achilles, the
foremost Greek warrior.1
Patrocles has donned Achilles' famous armour and gone into battle against
Hector, because Achilles is on strike, as the result of a quarrel with the Greek
leader Agammemnon, who, in an action which Achilles considered
dishonoured him, had taken away one of the slave-girls whom Achilles had
won as war booty.
Enraged by and guilty about Patrocles' death at the hands of Hector, Achilles
leads the Greeks into battle against the Trojans with the goal of taking
vengeance on Hector, who is now wearing Achilles' armour, which he had
stripped from Patrocles' fallen body. In a famous passage, Achilles pursues
Hector three times around the walls of Troy, before finally killing him in face to
face combat (with, it must be admitted, some divine assistance along the
way).
But that is not the end of the matter. Achilles pierces the tendons of Hector's
ankles and ties him to the back of his chariot and drives off, dragging Hector's
body feet first behind him, head dragging in the dust. For twelve days, Achilles
continues to treat Hector's body in this way, dragging him round and round
Patrocles' tomb, to the horror not only of the Trojans but also of his own
compatriots. Finally, Hector's father, the frail and elderly King Priam, comes
alone to beg Achilles to give him his son's body for burial, and appeals to their
common humanity. Achilles, overcome by Priam's appeal, agrees to stop his
desecration of Hector's corpse and to return him to his father for burial.
                                           
1 Iliad, Books 22 and 24
5In this tale and the social condemnation of Achilles' dishonouring of his
enemy's corpse – a prohibition that forms part of customary international law2
– we see a number of features of the modern law of war. Traditionally, the law
of war has been primarily concerned with regulating the conduct of hostilities
between opposing national armies in the field conducting conventional
warfare. These armies are, in modern times, generally reasonably well-
organised groups whose members are recognisable as combatants and which
possess a command structure that permits control to be exercised over the
conduct of the soldiers. This structure enhances the likelihood that the troops
will abide by the rules of warfare, which stipulate permissible targets,
acceptable methods of killing and causing damage to property and which
govern the treatment of non-combatants – or else be disciplined for their
failure to do so. In exchange for carrying out armed hostilities in accordance
with these rules, those involved are given immunity for their acts of killing and
their destruction of property in conformity with those rules, though a failure to
observe them strips them of that protection and renders them liable to
punishment for war crimes.
This model of warfare  - while prevalent at one time in history – has not been
the only form or even the dominant one in the last hundred years, as the
number of civil wars, wars of national liberation, internal armed conflicts,
insurgencies and other forms of intranational conflict have burgeoned. The
laws of war and International humanitarian law have evolved to cover many of
these situations of non-international armed conflict. As a result, non-State
groups engaged in armed hostilities may benefit from the same privileges and
immunities that members of the State's armed forces enjoy, provided that they
satisfy certain minimum criteria (in particular relating to organisational
structure).
But what of those groups which do not satisfy those criteria and yet engage in
an attack of the sort we saw on September 11, or in hostilities on the ground
                                           
2 Prosecutor v Tadic, International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Trial Chamber
II, Judgment of 7 May 1997, para. 748.
6in Afghanistan? Were those who instigated, planned and carried out the
September 11 attacks – even before President Bush rhetorically declared
America's "war" on terrorism and launched the military campaign against
Afghanistan – engaged in armed conflict as unprivileged combatants (and
thus subject to the rigours of the law of war), or are these merely criminal
acts? The notion that there was an armed conflict in existence before
September 11 (even taking into account prior Al Qaeda attacks against US
interests) seems unpersuasive, so it is hard to see that those acts could be
governed by the laws of war, though criminal offences under US law they
certainly are, and they may well also qualify as crimes against humanity under
international law.
Even after the military campaign had started and there clearly was an armed
conflict, the issue is whether the model afforded by the laws of war provides a
satisfactory framework for dealing with those who have been captured during
the conflict and who are now detained in Guantánamo Bay, or whether a
criminal law enforcement approach is more apt.
It seems clear that those captured on the ground in Afghanistan, either
because they were fighting as Al Qaeda supporters or because they were
perceived to be members of the organisation do not enjoy the status of
privileged combatants under international law (though it is arguable that
Taleban fighters do). The consequence is that Al Qaeda fighters can be tried
for the very act of engaging in combat, in addition to incurring criminal liability
for any crimes they may have committed. Further, they are not entitled to the
rights granted to prisoners of war under the Geneva Conventions, though they
will benefit from minimum standards of protection under international
humanitarian law and international human rights law (subject to any
permissible limitations or derogations that apply to the situation).
This is the international legal background to the controversy that has
surrounded the US treatment of the detainees held in Guantánamo Bay. If
they were not lawful combatants, then they do not enjoy the immunities of the
lawful combatant; they may be detained and charged with offences arising
7from their participation in the conflict, but in so doing the authorities must
observe basic procedural guarantees, including presumably the specification
within a reasonable time of a charge and a trial within a reasonable period.
But is the framework which is being applied – that of war and the laws of
armed conflict – a satisfactory model for these sorts of cases? The laws of
war envisage the return of detainees to their countries once hostilities have
concluded. When will the war against terrorism be concluded, or at least the
relevant part of it that would mean the return of detainees who continue to be
held without charge or trial? Is indefinite detention countenanced by the law of
war and, if so, should it be in circumstances such as these? How do we
address what may be legitimate concerns about detainees returning to their
countries and taking up such activities again? Is a criminal law enforcement
framework more appropriate, or do we need some hybrid?
President Bush's own Military Order of 13 November 2001 providing for the
establishment of military commissions to try detainees suggests that neither
framework seems entirely appropriate, as it elides the frameworks of war and
criminal justice. In providing for the establishment of military tribunals to try
suspected Al Qaeda members, the Order drew on a model of justice
appropriate only to war time or its immediate aftermath. This not only reflected
the fact that most of the detainees were detained in a situation of armed
conflict in Afghanistan, but also that the measure was designed to avoid
granting the full panoply of procedural and substantive rights that a criminal
trial before a US civil court or event before a court-martial would bring.
On the other hand, the Order also recites international terrorism and
membership of Al Qaeda as part of its rationale, terms which are located more
securely in the field of international criminal law than in the law of war. The
elision is seen in the specification of the crimes for which the detainees may
be tried: these include both crimes under the law of war and "other applicable
law", the latter presumably referring to violations of US criminal laws. Of
course, an act of terrorism may also be a war crime, but the blending of the
categories is clear here, and it seems that a detainee may be tried before a
8military commission for both a violation of the laws of war and an ordinary
criminal offence under US law.
In short, my argument is that in legal terms the "war" approach to issues of
international terrorism is a problematic one. It is made possible only by the
particular circumstances of the events of September 11 and the fact that the
Taliban government was seen to be harbouring the Al Qaeda network on the
territory of Afghanistan. Unless similar circumstances arise again (and they
may) and the use of force is once again permitted or tolerated as it was in
relation to Afghanistan, however useful the metaphor of the war against
terrorism may be, the legal utility of a "war" framework will not be of great
assistance. The conduct of such a "war" against a network dispersed across
many countries will need to take a different form entirely, unless we are
perhaps to see a new phenomenon emerge of surgical military strikes by a
form of international posse.
At the same time, it may also be appropriate to undertake a further review of
the adequacy of the existing international humanitarian and human rights law
to cases such as Guantánomo Bay. If that body of law provides us with no
fitting solution to a situation of indefinite detention based on an situation of
"armed conflict" quite different from those in contemplation when these
provisions were drafted, then it may be time to fix the limitations of those laws.
Yet, you might ask, does the criminal justice model provide a better option, in
a context where there was no reasonable prospect of securing extradition,
there are enormous difficulties in gathering evidence of specific offences, and
providing the full range of procedural protections before US courts would
involve unacceptable compromises of intelligence sources that could assist in
future terrorist attacks? While these sorts of concerns are legitimate, there are
reasonable answers to them.
Neither the law of armed conflict model or that of criminal justice – to the
extent that they exclude all but the US authorities and trial before either US
military commissions or US courts – addresses the concern about legitimacy
9resulting from perceived bias. That could only be addressed if an international
tribunal were given jurisdiction, as many have suggested-- not one, as one US
law professor proposed, consisting only of American and Muslim judges, but
one more broadly representative of the international community.
The strategy of addressing international terrorism as an issue of international
criminal law enforcement finds clear support in past and present international
efforts to address terrorism. It is to these efforts that I now turn, to explore
some of the challenges that face us in that arena, notwithstanding the
international unanimity that terrorism is a scourge and should be fought by
with all the resources that the international community can bring to bear on it
individually and collectively.
B. INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO ADDRESS TERRORISM:
THE CHALLENGE OF DEFINITION
International responses to terrorism are nothing new, though it may be argued
that the nature of modern international terrorism and the extent of the
suffering and damage that may result from terrorist acts are now significantly
different.
The use of violence to intimidate a government or civilian population reaches
back to the times of classical history.3 Yet there are many varieties of
terrorism, and historical and political context play a role in defining the form
the use of terror may take.
There are at least two broad senses in which the term terrorism has been
used. The use of the term as part of modern political discourse is commonly
traced to the 18th century, and it "was originally used to denote the use of
terror by the French revolutionary government against its political
opponents".4 The term was similarly used to describe the approach of the
Bolshevik government to its opponents, and this sense of the term has had
contemporary relevance under the designation of State terrorism. Of course,
                                           
3 See generally Walter Laqueur,  The New Terrorism (1999)
4 Fred Halliday, "Terrorism", May 2001, http://www.globalpolicy.org/wtc/terrorism/2510t.htm
10
the practice of using tactics of terror violence to cow civilian populations has a
far longer history than does the term itself. Famous examples include the
Roman use of terror over their subjected peoples, such as the use of mass
crucifixion in the wake of the slave revolt led by Spartacus in 73 BCE.5
The other important dimensions of the term – the one that is more common
today --involves the use of violence against the State or the community. What
Halliday calls the prehistory of terrorism involved "acts of assassination for
political and religio-political ends"6 and is to be found throughout history.
Indeed, the word "assassin" entered the English language as a result of the
activities of some members of the medieval Islamic sect, the Hashashin, a
group that engaged in political assassinations and that no doubt inspired
Terry Pratchett's Assassins' Guild in his Discworld novels. In more recent
times, anti-State terrorism was a feature of the 19th and early 20th century
campaigns of anarchists and nationalists.
In our times, though, we have seen further evolution of the phenomenon of
"terrorism". The 20th century saw the frequent use of violence against colonial
regimes as part of the struggle for independence from colonial rule. In the
second half of the century we saw the use of such tactics by groups using
tactics of terror violence to bring about revolutionary changes in their own
societies (Latin America being a major area for such activities, but Europe
also saw its share of such groups).
International responses to terrorism as a specific phenomenon began as long
ago as 1937, when the League of Nations adopted a Convention for the
Prevention and Punishment of Terrorism (a treaty that never entered into
force). The bulk of the international work, though, has taken place in the
United Nations since the 1960s, in response to a series of aircraft hijackings
which were followed by other terrorist attacks on a variety of targets using
                                           
5 "Terrorism – Then and Now", interview with Sol Encel, 24 March 2002, Ockham's Razor,
ABC Radio National, http://www.abc.net.au/rn/science/ockham/stories/s510828.htm
6 Halliday, supra note 4.
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different methods. Many of you will remember the killing of Israeli athletes at
the Munich Olympics in 1972, the shipjacking of the Achille Lauro, and the
frequent hijackings or bombings of aircraft that took place during these years.
The response of the international community within the United Nations
framework was to adopt a series of conventions addressing each of these
different phenomena  – conventions on hijacking of aircraft and ships, on
actions against the safety of civil aviation, and related matters.7
These conventions – all of which are described by the United Nations as part
of its panoply of anti-terrorist measures8 – share three principal
characteristics:
(a) they all adopted an "operational definition" of a specific type of terrorist
act that was defined without reference to the underlying political or
ideological purpose or motivation of the perpetrator of the act - this
reflected a consensus that there were some acts that were such a
serious threat to the interests of all that they could not be justified by
reference to such motives;
(b) they all focused on actions by non-State actors (individuals and
organisations) and the State was seen as an active ally in the struggle
against terrorism - the question of the State itself as terrorist actor was
left largely to one side; and
(c) they all adopted a criminal law enforcement model to address the
problem, under which States would cooperate in the apprehension and
prosecution of those alleged to have committed these crimes.
This act-specific approach to addressing problems of terrorism in binding
international treaties has continued up until relatively recently. Although
political denunciation of terrorism in all its forms had continued apace, there
                                           
7 For a useful collection of documents on terrorism see Omer Yousif Elagab (ed),
International law documents relating to terrorism  (London:  Cavendish Pub., 2nd ed 1997)
8 See the collection of treaties and other relevant documentation on the United Nations
website: "UN Action Against Terrorism", http://www.un.org/terrorism.
12
had been no successful attempt to define "terrorism" as such in a broad sense
that was satisfactory for legal purposes. There was also some scepticism as
to the necessity, desirability and feasibility of producing an agreed and
workable general definition.
That situation appears to have changed with the events of September 11.
This is not only because States wish for political reasons to be seen to be
taking action on a broad front against terrorism by adding to international and
national prohibitions on terrorism. It has also become a matter of some legal
importance. Following the events of September 11, the UN Security Council,
in a binding resolution (Resolution 1373), obliged Member States of the UN to
take a wide range of actions to prevent and punish terrorist acts and to attack
the support structures of terrorism.
These obligations include ensuring that terrorist acts are criminal offences
under domestic law, a task which requires reasonably precise definitions of
the act which are criminalised.  Yet the Security Council resolution contains
no adequate definition or description of the terrorism it roundly condemns.
While the events of September 11 may not have given rise to definitional
problems, it is by no means certain that a similar consensus can be reached
on a comprehensive definition of terrorism of this sort.
Defining terrorism
One direct consequence of September 11 was to give significant impetus to
efforts by the United Nations to adopt such a comprehensive anti-terrorism
convention. The goal is to adopt a convention that is not limited to a specific
type of terrorist act but which provides a workable general definition for
addressing terrorism through national criminal legislation and transnational
law enforcement cooperation. Prior to September 11, the UN had recently
adopted conventions on terrorist bombing and terrorist financing, and begun
work on a broader convention. Given a significant impetus by the events of
September 11, the proposed convention is at the centrepiece of the UN's legal
response to those events.
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Previous efforts to formulate a general definition of terrorism have run into a
number of common difficulties, and the current efforts are grappling with the
same issues. These are not just technical issues, but raise controversial
policy and political issues.
The first of these is whether to include State terrorism in the definition of
terrorism or to limit the concept to acts of non-State entities. Perhaps
unsurprisingly, in international fora States have thus far been unwilling to
include in a binding treaty provisions applying to acts of terror committed by
States themselves – the target of the new regime is non-State entities.
A second stumbling-block has been the question of whether a terrorist act
should defined only by reference to the nature of the act or whether it should
also take into account the motivation or objective of the person who commits
the act. In other words, are all instances of particular types of violence terrorist
acts, or are there some which are not unlawful under international law? This
question is essentially a variant of the well-worn aphorism that "one person's
terrorist is another person's freedom fighter", a view borne out at least by the
practice of States over the years (if not by dictates of logic or principled policy
on the matter).
A third issue has been the relationship between the acts defined as terrorist
acts (and therefore international crimes) and the right of non-State actors to
use violence against State targets in situations of armed conflict. This
discussion has been motivated by a concern that the relatively powerless non-
State actor facing a situation of armed conflict might be deprived of existing
rights to use force in response to violence by the State, by the simple
expedient of defining the group's resort to violence as terrorism.
A fourth issue has been the critical one of the impact that a broad definition of
terrorism may have on the exercise of internationally protected human rights,
in particular the tactics that groups may adopt to influence governments and
other institutions to adopt or change specific policies or laws (were the events
of the "other September 11" in Seattle some years ago terrorist acts?). A
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related issue has been the double-edged nature of imposing an international
obligation on a State to eradicate terrorism in view of the danger that some
States may take advantage of the opportunity to intrude unduly into existing
guarantees such as the right to privacy and rights relating to the enforcement
of criminal laws, and to erect anti-terrorist measures that are used in a
repressive manner.
All of these difficulties can be seen in the latest efforts of the UN committee
tasked with the job of drafting the comprehensive convention on international
terrorism. The Committee goes by the revealing name of the Ad Hoc
Committee established by General Assembly Resolution 51/210 of 17
December 1996, but it is in fact the committee which drafted the International
Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings 1997 and the
International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism
Convention 1999.
At its latest meeting (held earlier this year), the Committee came close to
finalising much of the text of a draft convention.9 However, the provisions on
which agreement is still to be reached include the final definition of terrorism10
and whether specific acts of non-State actors resisting foreign occupation, etc
are to be excluded from the Convention, and the extent to which actions of a
State's armed forces should be covered by the Convention. The current
                                           
9 See Report of the Ad Hoc Committee established by General Assembly Resolution 51/210
of 17 December 1996 (Sixth session – 28 January -1 February 2002), UN Doc A/57/37
(2002).
10 The current status of discussions on the definition of terrorism is to be found in "Informal
texts of articles 2 and 2 bis of the draft comprehensive convention, prepared by the
Coordinator", A/57/37, Annex II. The central feature of the definition of terrorism is the
following:
"Article 2
1. Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that
person, by any means, unlawfully and intentionally, causes:
(a) Death or serious bodily injury to any person; or
(b) Serious damage to public or private property, including a place of public
use, a State or government facility, a public transportation system, an
infrastructure facility or the environment; or
(c) Damage to property, places, facilities, or systems referred to in paragraph
1(b) of this article, resulting or likely to result in major economic loss,
when the purpose of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a
population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or
abstain from doing any act.
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definition is of particular relevance for Australian law, as it was in part the
basis for the definition in the anti-terrorism legislation that was recently
critically reviewed by the Senate Standing Committee on Constitutional and
Legal Affairs,11 and subsequently withdrawn by the government for revision in
the light of the Committee's report that was critical of the scope of the
definition.
It is not my purpose to parse the proposed definition here in any detailed way.
But it may be noted that the unresolved issues raise at least one major issue
of fundamental legal, moral and political importance. That is the extent to
which the international community is prepared to deny to non-State actors the
resort to violence or threat of violence in response to repression by the State.
While it may still be permissible for a non-State actor to use violence
legitimately in situations such as civil war or other situations involving internal
armed conflict, the issue has not been finally resolved whether under this
convention a non-State actor in what it feels is a powerless position against
an oppressor government may legitimately resort to violence, at least against
government targets. The two alternatives being discussed diverge on this
issue, with the text proposed by the Member States of the Organization of the
Islamic Conference providing that the Convention will not apply to "the
activities of the parties during an armed conflict, including in situations of
foreign occupation".12
While this disagreement is plainly focused on the situation in the Middle East,
there may arguably be other applications. But if we are to grasp the nettle of
rejecting violence as a tactic other than in situations of internal armed conflict,
then we must also ask what succour international law provides to those who
are on the receiving end of the State repression or fundamental denial of
rights, and whom States have already shown themselves ready to denounce
                                           
11 Senate Constitutional and Legal Affairs Committee, Inquiry into the Security Legislation
Amendment (Terrorism) Bill 2002 [No.2] and Related Bills, 10 May 2002,
http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/legcon_ctte/terrorism/report/Security.pdf
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as terrorists and to continue their suppression of them as part of a campaign
against terrorism.
C. TERRORISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS
The final aspect of the aftermath of September 11 I wish to touch on tonight is
the relationship between terrorism and human rights. The events of
September 11 have given governments and communities in many parts of the
world a sense of urgency in taking steps to prevent the occurrence of similar
acts. These measures have included the passage of legislation creating new
offences, the establishment of special procedures for the investigation of
persons suspected of involvement in terrorist offences (or even of being able
to provide information about such matters), and the detention for long periods
without trial of hundreds of people in the Untied States and Europe on
grounds of suspicion of involvement in terrorism or assisting those who are so
involved.
This sense of urgency/emergency has led to the proposal of measures that
would in “ordinary” times have been rejected by legislatures and societies. But
the argument is that times are different, that we face a real threat of an
unprecedented sort that can only be addressed by stringent (and possibly
unprecedented) measures. We are in the middle of the classic debate that so
often occurs in times of real or purported emergency – to what extent do the
threats we are told we face justify intruding on the rights we hold dear?
                                                                                                                            
12 Texts relating to article 18 of the draft comprehensive convention, Text proposed by the
Member States of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, A/57/37, Annex IV, art 18(2).
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On the international level the relationship between terrorism and human rights
has a number of strands. Human rights and terrorism have long been linked
as issues. The dominant form of that linkage in the political organs of the
United Nations – in particular in the form of regular General Assembly
resolutions on the topic – has seen matters from the perspective that terrorism
poses a threat to the enjoyment of human rights. The violation of human rights
committed by those engaged in actions against the State that may be
described as terrorist thus provides a ground of legitimation for measures
taken by the State against its political opponents. While these resolutions
generally pay lip-service to the need to have regard to international human
rights standards in any actions against terrorism at the national level, this
caution is very much a subsidiary feature of the discussion, frequently ignored
in practice.
The discourse of protection of human rights thus becomes a further ground to
legitimate government’s actions in suppressing the activities of terrorism.
While we can all accept that terrorism can frequently involve the violation of
the human rights of those affected by it, we are only too aware of the way in
which that rationale has been selectively used to justify the violation of other
human rights.
This pattern has been evident in the post September 11 world. A number of
countries have gladly climbed aboard the juggernaut of the "war against
terrorism", happy to denounce their subordinated populations, insurgent
groups, or discontented and oppressed minorities as "terrorists", and to
legitimate their efforts to suppress the exercise of internationally guaranteed
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rights as part of the fight against terrorism. In addition, many countries have
enacted legislation that provides broad powers to infringe on human rights,
justified by reference to the fight against terrorism and bolstered by the notion
that not only international criminal law but also the protection of human rights
can be invoked to justify these measures.
The dangers that such an approach poses have been well recognised by
certain parts of the United Nations and many organisations in international an
national civil society. The message is that the rush to condemn and eradicate
terrorism should not lead us into such a state of intoxication with repressive
measures that we lose sight of the damage we may be doing, in the pursuit of
what may turn out in any event to be ineffectual measures.
The voice of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson,
has been prominent among those who have urged caution and restraint. In
joint statements with political leaders and in detailed and thoughtful reports
presented to the UN Commission Human Rights, she has not only reiterated
this admonition and reminded States of their international human rights
obligations, but set out in detail the careful scrutiny that should be undertaken
in the light of human rights standards when addressing issues of terrorism.
Equally, the UN Committee against Torture has urged States parties to the
UN Convention against Torture that situations of emergency do not justify the
use of torture and calling on States to ensure that they observe the provisions
of the Convention especially in times of emergency, when the temptation to
ignore them may be at its strongest. These reminders are important, and have
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had an impact in some national debate about anti-terrorist measures,
Australia being one example.
However, international experience and jurisprudence also provides other
lessons for us in responding to situations of crisis. Primary among them is a
warning against the approach of "exceptionalism" – of being too ready to
accept that the threats that we perceive are so great that we are justified in
establishing new institutions and procedures outside existing institutions to
address these threats. The establishment of special or military courts,
restrictions on normal procedural rights, incommunicado detention, or secret
trials – all variously justified as required by exceptional circumstances – have
all tended to bring in their wake further violations of human rights, and too
infrequently have they been effective in resolving the problems they seek to
address. The troubling exceptionalism of the detention of Al Qaeda and
Taliban captives at Guantánomo Bay – where they apparently cannot access
US constitutional relief or any international forum – and the exceptional nature
of the military commissions proposed to try them are vivid illustrations of the
point.
How does this all relate to the Australian situation? None of us wants to see
our society suffer the type of terrorist attack seen on September 11, or one of
the other types of acts foretold by those who warn us of the (potential)
dangers – whether it be a biological, chemical or nuclear threat. You no doubt
recall the collective frisson – or perhaps mild panic – seen a few weeks ago in
Sydney, when two military aircraft started circling Sydney harbour in the
vicinity of the tall buildings of the lower CBD. It turned out that the only
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shooting they were doing was photos. But the immediate response was there.
Or you may recall the speed with which the NSW police last week assured the
community that person who killed himself in a Sydney suburb by detonating a
bomb strapped to him was "just" a person who had committed suicide by
blowing himself up, and not a suicide bombing gone wrong. The ongoing
debate about the vulnerability of the Lucas Heights nuclear reactor in
Sydney's suburbs also shows that these fears are now part of our collective
psychology. Suggestions that there may be Al Qaeda links with Australia have
all contributed to the collective anxiety.
What, then, should be our response at the national level to September 11 and
the threats that we are told we may be facing? In addressing this question, we
have a number of advantages that give us the chance to react calmly and
thoughtfully – we are physically distant from the events of September 11, we
are not (or at least so far have not been) a high priority target; we have had
the luxury of time to formulate our response; and as a result our political
debate over the issue has permitted a wide range of views to be heard –
oppositional views have not been silenced or reviled or declared unpatriotic or
pro-terrorist, as .has been the case elsewhere.
There seems little doubt that as a matter of international legal obligation and
policy we need new legislation incorporating many of the features that were
contained in the recent package of anti-terrorist legislation introduced by the
government. The anomalous situation revealed by the inability of anyone to
specify a crime for which David Hicks could be prosecuted under Australian
law if he were returned to Australia – treason and mercenarism having been
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the only two potential contenders – suggests that there are holes in our legal
coverage of acts that deserve sanction.
More problematic, though, are a number of the other provisions of that draft
legislation, including the definition of a terrorist act and its potential
overinclusivness, membership offences, reverse onus provisions, and wide-
ranging investigative powers. It is not my intention to examine these in detail –
that job has been recently done in a painstaking and in my view persuasive
analysis by the Senate Committee on Constitutional and Legal Affairs. What
the content of the revised version that the government will bring back to the
Parliament is unclear, but it is probably too early to conclude that all the
problems will have gone away. But the firm approach that the Senate
Committee has taken so far commends itself as the appropriate type of
scrutiny of such wide-ranging provisions.
You may well ask whether this sort of approach falls too readily into a
comfortable civil libertarian complacency that fails to reflect the real extent of
the risks we face and the radically different nature of terrorist networks that
need different, more extensive powers beyond those that are normally needed
for national and international criminal law enforcement? Do not the
extraordinary risks and dangers justify the measures that have been
proposed?
My own response to these sorts of arguments is still civil libertarian, though I
hope not too complacently so. It is a commonplace in the light of such claims
of unprecedented dangers to refer to a list of previous examples in which
warnings of disastrous consequences to come if particular measures were not
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adopted have been unpersuasive and the predicted consequences have not
eventuated. Our own Australian locus classicus is, of course, the issue of
communism in the early 1950s,and the rejection of the Government's
predictions of doom by both the High Court in the Communist Party case and
by the Australian people at the referendum on the subject held on 22
September 1951 (both of which, it may be mentioned are discussed in the
Oxford Companion to the High Court of Australia, at p 123).
But, of course, one can be wrong, and it is a brave person who would be bold
enough to give an assurance that these things could never happen. However,
at a time when there is a real risk of major military conflict between India and
Pakistan – possibly involving the use of nuclear weapons – one can be
justified in weighing the potential dangers of major terrorist attacks carefully
against the intrusions on human rights that may be involved, and being slow
to accept claims that existing powers and resources fall significantly short of
those that are needed to protect us against these threats.
A related issue is the likely efficacy of the measures proposed. While one can
accept that the use of intelligence-gathering powers and powers of
investigation may help to identify and prevent some terrorist threats, it is less
clear that more, and more extensive powers will bring a proportionate
increase in detection and prevention. Recent discussion of the extent to which
US government agencies had information that would have enabled it to
identify and prevent the attacks of September 11 have shown that the
problem may have been too much intelligence.
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The call for more and greater powers appeals at a deeper emotional level to
our sense of insecurity – in this way, it is intimated, we will achieve a relatively
cost-free increase in our personal and community security. This is a troubling
sirenic call, since it promises something that is unachievable, total personal
security from such threats. It also gives prominence to the terrorist threat in a
way that the experience of everyday life does not confirm – the risk of being
affected by a terrorist attack, as opposed to some other form of violent crime
or being injured in an accident, is still negligible. The US Department of
State's most recent report, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001, released earlier
this month, states that 2001 saw the highest number of people killed in any
previous year by terrorist attacks. However, of the 3,547 people who died,
most of those died in the one series of attacks on September 11, and the
overall number of terrorist attacks fell last year from 426 incidents to 328.
It seems inevitable that the Parliament will eventually pass anti-terrorism
legislation. The final product will no doubt be less dramatic in reach than the
original proposals. Even so, it seems equally inevitable that the process of
political compromise and the inherent generality of the definitions of some of
the proscribed acts will still be problematic and that the dangers they prose to
human rights will only emerge in specific cases in the future. In my view, this
type of legislation is yet another illustration of the need for a Bill of Rights –
not because the Parliamentary process has not work, in fact it has, and rather
well so far – but there are limits to the clairvoyance of even the most far-
seeing Parliament.
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CONCLUSION
When I was preparing what was the last lecture in this series of
inaugural/valedictory series, I thought that it was incumbent on me to do refer
briefly to the lectures given by my colleagues. I hope that in my remarks
tonight I have touched on some of the themes that they touched on in their
lectures, albeit in a different context – these themes being the importance of
openness and transparency in the exercise of the power of the State (Joh
McMillan), the response of the law to unconscionability (Jim Davis), our
pursuit of the goals of fairness in human relations mediated though law
(Phillipa Weeks) and, finally treason and the question of a Bill of Rights and
the role of judges (Tom Campbell). The challenge of responding to
contemporary forms of terrorism is very much with us, and we must reach
deep into those traditions to ensure that we find the right way forward.
